Alonte vs. Sevillano. Jr.

Alonte vs. Sevillano. Jr.

G.R. No. 131652 & 131728,287 SCRA 245, March 9, 1998 

FACTS: Petitioners were charged for rape before the RTC of Binan, Laguna. A petition for a change of venue to RTC of Manila was filed by the offended party. During the pendency of such petition, the offended party executed an affidavit of desistance. The court granted the change of venue. Public respondent Judge Savellano issued warrant of arrest for both petitioners. Alonte surrendered and Concepcion posted bail.

They pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion Perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners-accused were denied of due process.
RULING: YES.

There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.

Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require:

(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;

(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;

(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and

(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a “law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.”