Antiporda vs. Garchitorena

Antiporda vs. Garchitorena

G.R. No. L-133289, 321 SCRA 551, December 23, 1999

FACTS: Petitioners were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos filed before the Sandiganbayan without claiming that one of the accused is a public officer who took advantage of his position. The information was amended to effectively describe the offense charged herein and for the court to effectively exercise its jurisdiction over the same by stating that Antiporda took advantage of his position. Accused filed a motion for new preliminary investigation and to hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued. The same was denied. The accused subsequently filed a motion to quash the amended information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged because of the amended information. This was denied as well as the MR on the same. Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter. RULING: YES. They are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein. However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation dated June 10, 1997 filed with the same court, it was they who "challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected. Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. In the case of Arula vs. Espino it was quite clear that all three requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the offense, territory and person, must concur before a court can acquire jurisdiction to try a case. It is undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial jurisdiction over the case. And we are in accord with the petitioners when they contended that when they filed a motion to quash it was tantamount to a voluntary submission to the Court's authority.

People vs. Mariano

People vs. Mariano

G.R. No. L-40527, 71 SCRA 600, June 30, 1976

FACTS: Respondent Mariano was charged with Estafa before the CFI of Bulacan because of misappropriating and converting for his own personal use, power cord and electric cables being the person in authority to receive the same in behalf of mayor Nolasco of SJDM, Bulacan. Respondent Mariano then moved to quash the information for, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction. He claimed that the items were the same items used against mayor Nolasco before the Military commission for Malversation of public property to which mayor Nolasco were found guilty, hence, the court a quo has no jurisdiction.

The judge granted the motion. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction over the Estafa case against Mariano.

RULING: YES. The CFI has jurisdiction “In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos” Section 44, paragraph E, Judiciary reorganization act of 1948. The offense of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is penalized with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. By reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6) months imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance.

Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction over the estafa case against respondent Mariano with the filing of the malversation charge against Mayor Nolasco before the Military Commission. Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct offenses and in the case now before Us the accused in one is different from the accused in the other.

“Criminal Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it. 

Alonte vs. Sevillano. Jr.

Alonte vs. Sevillano. Jr.

G.R. No. 131652 & 131728,287 SCRA 245, March 9, 1998 

FACTS: Petitioners were charged for rape before the RTC of Binan, Laguna. A petition for a change of venue to RTC of Manila was filed by the offended party. During the pendency of such petition, the offended party executed an affidavit of desistance. The court granted the change of venue. Public respondent Judge Savellano issued warrant of arrest for both petitioners. Alonte surrendered and Concepcion posted bail.

They pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion Perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners-accused were denied of due process.
RULING: YES.

There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.

Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require:

(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;

(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;

(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and

(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a “law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.”

Case Digest: Rogelio Reyes vs. NLRC and Universal Robina

ROGELIO REYES

vs

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION GROCERY DIVISION,

G.R. No. 160233,   August 8, 2007

Justice Ynares-Santiago

Labor Law; Labor Standard; 13 month pay;

 FACTS:

Petitioner was employed as a salesman at private respondents Grocery Division in Davao City on August 12, 1977. He was eventually appointed as unit manager of Sales Department-South Mindanao District, a position he held until his retirement on November 30, 1997. Thereafter, he received a letter regarding the computation of his separation pay.

Insisting that his retirement benefits and 13^th month pay must be based on the average monthly salary of P42,766.19, which consists of P10,919.22 basic salary and P31,846.97 average monthly commission, petitioner refused to accept the check issued by private respondent in the amount of P200,322.21. Instead, he filed a complaint before the arbitration branch of the NLRC for, inter alia, 13^th month pay.

The Labor Arbiter held that the sales commission is part of the basic salary of a unit manager.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter by excluding the overriding commission in the computation of the 13^th month pay. Bothe parties MR but was denied. Only petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed for lack of merit. MR denied hence this petition before the SC (R45)

ISSUE:

Whether the commission is included in the computation of the 13^th month pay as it forms part of the basic salary.

HELD:

NO.

Insofar as what constitutes basic salary, the foregoing discussions equally apply to the computation of petitioners 13^th month pay. As held in San Miguel Corporation v. Inciong:

Under Presidential Decree 851 and its implementing rules, the basic salary of an employee is used as the basis in the determination of his 13th-month pay. Any compensations or remunerations which are deemed not part of the basic pay is excluded as basis in the computation of the mandatory bonus.

Under the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851, the following compensations are deemed not part of the basic salary:

a)         Cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree 525 and Letter of Instruction No. 174;

b)         Profit sharing payments;

c)         All allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular basic salary of the employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree on December 16, 1975. (Emphasis supplied)

            Aside from the fact that as unit manager petitioner did not enter into actual sale transactions, but merely supervised the salesmen under his control, the disputed commissions were not regularly received by him. Only when the salesmen were able to collect from the sale transactions can petitioner receive the commissions. Conversely, if no collections were made by the salesmen, then petitioner would receive no commissions at all. In fine, the commissions which petitioner received were not part of his salary structure but were profit-sharing payments and had no clear, direct or necessary relation to the amount of work he actually performed. The collection made by the salesmen from the sale transactions was the profit of private respondent from which petitioner had a share in the form of a commission.

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Case Digest: Central azucarerra vs. Central azucarerra union-nlu

CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC, 

vs.  

CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNION-NLU,

 G.R. No. 188949,  July 26, 2010

Justice Nachura

Labor Law; Labor Standard; 13 month pay;

FACTS:

The formula used by petitioner in computing the 13th-month pay was: Total Basic Annual Salary divided by twelve (12). Included in petitioner’s computation of the Total Basic Annual Salary were the following: basic monthly salary; first eight (8) hours overtime pay on Sunday and legal/special holiday; night premium pay; and vacation and sick leaves for each year. Throughout the years, petitioner used this computation until 2006 from 1975.

                After the strike and temporary cessation of operations in 2005, all the striking union was allowed to return to work. Subsequently, petitioner declared another temporary cessation of operations for the months of April and May 2006. After the suspension was lifted on June 2006, the workers were allowed to report for work on a fifteen day-per-month rotation basis until September 2005. In December 2006, petitioner gave the employees their 13th-month pay based on the employee’s total earnings during the year divided by 12. In December 2006, petitioner gave the employees their 13th-month pay based on the employee’s total earnings during the year divided by 12.

Respondent objected to this computation. It claimed that the divisor should have been eight (8) instead of 12, because the employees worked for only 8 months in 2006.

Petitioner and respondent tried to thresh out their differences in accordance with the grievance procedure as provided in their collective bargaining agreement. Despite four (4) conciliatory meetings, the parties still failed to settle the dispute, hence a complaint by for money claims based on the alleged diminution/erroneous computation of 13^th month pay   before the Labor arbiter (LA).

The LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed. MR denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. CA dismissed the petition and affirm the NLRC. Hence petition before the SC (R45)

ISSUE:

Whether the computation of 13^th month pay by the petitioner is correct.

HELD:

YES. "Thirteenth-month pay" shall mean one twelfth (1/12) of the basic salary of an employee within a calendar year; the term "basic salary" of an employee for the purpose of computing the 13th-month pay was interpreted to include all remuneration or earnings paid by the employer for services rendered, but does not include allowances and monetary benefits which are not integrated as part of the regular or basic salary, such as the cash equivalent of unused vacation and sick leave credits, overtime, premium, night differential and holiday pay, and cost-of-living allowances. However, these salary-related benefits should be included as part of the basic salary in the computation of the 13th-month pay if, by individual or collective agreement, company practice or policy, the same are treated as part of the basic salary of the employees.

As correctly ruled by the CA, the practice of petitioner in giving 13th-month pay based on the employees’ gross annual earnings which included the basic monthly salary, premium pay for work on rest days and special holidays, night shift differential pay and holiday pay continued for almost thirty (30) years and has ripened into a company policy or practice which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn. Article 100 of the Labor Code, otherwise known as the Non-Diminution Rule, mandates that benefits given to employees cannot be taken back or reduced unilaterally by the employer because the benefit has become part of the employment contract, written or unwritten.