Antiporda vs. Garchitorena

Antiporda vs. Garchitorena

G.R. No. L-133289, 321 SCRA 551, December 23, 1999

FACTS: Petitioners were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos filed before the Sandiganbayan without claiming that one of the accused is a public officer who took advantage of his position. The information was amended to effectively describe the offense charged herein and for the court to effectively exercise its jurisdiction over the same by stating that Antiporda took advantage of his position. Accused filed a motion for new preliminary investigation and to hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued. The same was denied. The accused subsequently filed a motion to quash the amended information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged because of the amended information. This was denied as well as the MR on the same. Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter. RULING: YES. They are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein. However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation dated June 10, 1997 filed with the same court, it was they who "challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected. Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. In the case of Arula vs. Espino it was quite clear that all three requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the offense, territory and person, must concur before a court can acquire jurisdiction to try a case. It is undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial jurisdiction over the case. And we are in accord with the petitioners when they contended that when they filed a motion to quash it was tantamount to a voluntary submission to the Court's authority.

People vs. Mariano

People vs. Mariano

G.R. No. L-40527, 71 SCRA 600, June 30, 1976

FACTS: Respondent Mariano was charged with Estafa before the CFI of Bulacan because of misappropriating and converting for his own personal use, power cord and electric cables being the person in authority to receive the same in behalf of mayor Nolasco of SJDM, Bulacan. Respondent Mariano then moved to quash the information for, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction. He claimed that the items were the same items used against mayor Nolasco before the Military commission for Malversation of public property to which mayor Nolasco were found guilty, hence, the court a quo has no jurisdiction.

The judge granted the motion. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction over the Estafa case against Mariano.

RULING: YES. The CFI has jurisdiction “In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos” Section 44, paragraph E, Judiciary reorganization act of 1948. The offense of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is penalized with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. By reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6) months imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance.

Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction over the estafa case against respondent Mariano with the filing of the malversation charge against Mayor Nolasco before the Military Commission. Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct offenses and in the case now before Us the accused in one is different from the accused in the other.

“Criminal Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it. 

Alonte vs. Sevillano. Jr.

Alonte vs. Sevillano. Jr.

G.R. No. 131652 & 131728,287 SCRA 245, March 9, 1998 

FACTS: Petitioners were charged for rape before the RTC of Binan, Laguna. A petition for a change of venue to RTC of Manila was filed by the offended party. During the pendency of such petition, the offended party executed an affidavit of desistance. The court granted the change of venue. Public respondent Judge Savellano issued warrant of arrest for both petitioners. Alonte surrendered and Concepcion posted bail.

They pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion Perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners-accused were denied of due process.
RULING: YES.

There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.

Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require:

(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;

(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;

(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and

(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a “law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.”